Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Participation in Fraudulent Elections
|Springer Science and Business Media, LLC
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
|Vorobyev D. Participation in Fraudulent Elections / D. Vorobyev // Social Choice and Welfare. — 2016. — Vol. 46. — Iss. 4. — P. 863-892.
|I analyze a costly voting model of elections in which the incumbent can stuff the ballot box to investigate how electoral fraud affects the decisions of voters to participate. I find that two stable equilibria may exist: an abstention equilibrium, where none of the voters vote and the incumbent always wins, and a more efficient coordination equilibrium, where a substantial share of a challenger’s supporters vote and the candidate preferred by the majority is likely to win. I further show that because the higher capability of the incumbent to stuff a ballot box discourages the participation of his own supporters and creates participation incentives for the challenger’s supporters, higher fraud does not always benefit the incumbent, even when costless. The model may help to explain two empirical observations related to fraudulent elections: a positive relationship between fraud and the margin of victory and a negative relationship between fraud and voter turnout. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015.
|I would like to thank Michael Alvarez, Levent Celik, Libor Dusek, Peter Katuscak, John Ledyard, Jan Zapal and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. This paper was developed with institutional support RVO 67985998 from the Czech Academy of Sciences. The author declares that he has no conflict of interest other than double affiliation with Ural Federal University (Yekaterinburg, Russia) and CERGE-EI (Prague, Czech Republic).
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