UNDERSTANDING OF ELECTORAL REFORMS: TESTING THE THEORY OF THE “THREAT OF REVOLUTION” (the case of Georgia)

Abstract

The analysis of institutional changes is one of the main directions of academic political research. The approach to the study of changes in electoral systems puts the conceptualization of electoral reform on the academic agenda. The current period of development of political science is characterized by the expansion and refinement of the concepts relating to electoral reforms that go beyond the boundaries of the traditional theoretical approach. The explanation of electoral reforms should not be limited to the theory of rational choice, according to which institutional changes reflect the interests of those who accept them. The theory of the “threat of revolution” by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson was chosen as the analytical basis for this study. Using the method of case-study analysis and more specifically Process Tracing, the author aims to find answers to two interrelated research questions: why is the ruling elite reforming the electoral system? What was the causal mechanism that led to electoral reform? Georgia was chosen as the object of research in this article. The conclusions reached by the author challenge the standard approach (rational institutionalism) prevailing in the literature and confirm the central role of opposition and protests in stimulating institutional change. The main conclusion is that prolonged mass anti-government actions are one of the factors that contribute to the electoral reform. It is shown that the ruling party has made institutional changes, agreed with the demands of the opposition to reform the rules for holding parliamentary elections against the background of a potential threat of revolution. © (2023). All Rights Reserved.