Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10995/111137
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorVorobyev, D.en
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-12T08:13:31Z-
dc.date.available2022-05-12T08:13:31Z-
dc.date.issued2022-
dc.identifier.citationVorobyev D. Information Disclosure in Elections with Sequential Costly Participation / D. Vorobyev // Public Choice. — 2022. — Vol. 190. — Iss. 3-4. — P. 317-344.en
dc.identifier.issn0048-5829-
dc.identifier.otherAll Open Access, Green3
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10995/111137-
dc.description.abstractUsing a pivotal costly voting model of elections in which voters privately have formed preferences over two candidates and act sequentially, I study how different rules for disclosing information about the actions of early voters affect the actions of later voters, and how they ultimately affect voters’ and candidates’ welfare. Comparing three rules observed in real-life elections (no information disclosure, turnout disclosure and vote count disclosure), I find that vote count disclosure dominates the other two rules in terms of both voter welfare and the ex-ante likelihood of electing the candidate preferred by the majority. I show further that each of the rules can provide a candidate with either a greater or lesser chance of winning, depending on the levels of ex-ante support for the candidates. The findings may be useful for designing optimal voting procedures, particularly in settings with small numbers of voters. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.en
dc.description.sponsorshipFunding: this research was supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic; Grant 19-18741Y.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren1
dc.publisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLCen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.sourcePublic Choice2
dc.sourcePublic Choiceen
dc.subjectINFORMATION DISCLOSUREen
dc.subjectPARTICIPATIONen
dc.subjectVOTINGen
dc.titleInformation Disclosure in Elections with Sequential Costly Participationen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionen
dc.identifier.scopus85118364774-
local.contributor.employeeVorobyev, D., PRIGO University, Havirov, Czech Republic, CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russian Federationen
local.description.firstpage317-
local.description.lastpage344-
local.issue3-4-
local.volume190-
local.contributor.departmentPRIGO University, Havirov, Czech Republic; CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic; Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russian Federationen
local.identifier.eid2-s2.0-85118364774-
Appears in Collections:Научные публикации, проиндексированные в SCOPUS и WoS CC

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
2-s2.0-85118364774.pdf2,07 MBAdobe PDFView/Open


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.