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http://elar.urfu.ru/handle/10995/101796
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Averboukh, Y. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-08-31T14:59:53Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-08-31T14:59:53Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Averboukh Y. Approximate public-signal correlated equilibria for nonzero-sum differential games / Y. Averboukh. — DOI 10.1137/17M1161403 // SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization. — 2019. — Vol. 57. — Iss. 1. — P. 743-772. | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 3630129 | - |
dc.identifier.other | Final | 2 |
dc.identifier.other | All Open Access, Green | 3 |
dc.identifier.other | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85062696663&doi=10.1137%2f17M1161403&partnerID=40&md5=3d93c745e485202df57bd07bb611ce00 | |
dc.identifier.other | http://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.02871 | m |
dc.identifier.uri | http://elar.urfu.ru/handle/10995/101796 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We construct an approximate public-signal correlated equilibrium for a nonzero-sum differential game in the class of stochastic strategies with memory. The construction is based on a solution of an auxiliary nonzero-sum continuous-time stochastic game. This class of games includes stochastic differential games and continuous-time Markov games. Moreover, we study the limit of approximate equilibrium outcomes in the case when the auxiliary stochastic games tend to the original deterministic one. We show that it lies in the convex hull of the set of equilibrium values provided by deterministic punishment strategies. © 2019 Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics Publications | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.source | SIAM J Control Optim | 2 |
dc.source | SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization | en |
dc.subject | APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIUM | en |
dc.subject | CONTROL WITH MODEL | en |
dc.subject | NONZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAMES | en |
dc.subject | PUBLIC-SIGNAL CORRELATED STRATEGIES | en |
dc.subject | CONTINUOUS TIME SYSTEMS | en |
dc.subject | GAME THEORY | en |
dc.subject | APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIUMS | en |
dc.subject | CONTINUOUS-TIME | en |
dc.subject | CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA | en |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM VALUE | en |
dc.subject | NONZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAME | en |
dc.subject | PUBLIC-SIGNAL CORRELATED STRATEGIES | en |
dc.subject | STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME | en |
dc.subject | STOCHASTIC GAME | en |
dc.subject | STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS | en |
dc.title | Approximate public-signal correlated equilibria for nonzero-sum differential games | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1137/17M1161403 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | 85062696663 | - |
local.contributor.employee | Averboukh, Y., Krasovskii Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics, Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation, Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation | |
local.description.firstpage | 743 | - |
local.description.lastpage | 772 | - |
local.issue | 1 | - |
local.volume | 57 | - |
dc.identifier.wos | 000460129700029 | - |
local.contributor.department | Krasovskii Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics, Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation | |
local.contributor.department | Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation | |
local.identifier.pure | 4ccc70a5-5ee8-4c08-9044-dd16fc530100 | uuid |
local.identifier.pure | 9169671 | - |
local.identifier.eid | 2-s2.0-85062696663 | - |
local.identifier.wos | WOS:000460129700029 | - |
Appears in Collections: | Научные публикации ученых УрФУ, проиндексированные в SCOPUS и WoS CC |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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2-s2.0-85062696663.pdf | 399,74 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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