

Correction

Correction: Shutaleva, A. Epistemic Challenges in Neurophenomenology: Exploring the Reliability of Knowledge and Its Ontological Implications. *Philosophies* 2023, 8, 94

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The author would like to make the following corrections to the published paper [1]. The changes are as follows:

- (1) Affiliation change:
Department of Philosophy, Ural Federal University, 620002 Ekaterinburg, Russia.
- (2) Name correction of the philosopher Michelle Maiese in Section 2 “Theoretical Framework”.

Original text:

Michelle Maze presents an argument that challenges the traditional separation between cognitive and bodily aspects of emotions [49] (p. 514). Maze suggests that understanding emotions as a means of interacting with and giving meaning to the external world can help bridge this divide. Maze introduces the concept of affective framing as a foundational basis for emotional experiences. According to Maze, affective framing involves the evaluation of the environment through bodily sensations of care, which leads to the merging of cognitive and bodily elements in emotions. This concept not only clarifies the relationship between the cognitive and bodily aspects of emotions but also offers a valuable framework for understanding the intentional focus and phenomenal nature of emotional experiences.

Updated text:

Michelle Maiese presents an argument that challenges the traditional separation between cognitive and bodily aspects of emotions [49] (p. 514). Maiese suggests that understanding emotions as a means of interacting with and giving meaning to the external world can help bridge this divide. Maiese introduces the concept of affective framing as a foundational basis for emotional experiences. According to Maiese, affective framing involves the evaluation of the environment through bodily sensations of care, which leads to the merging of cognitive and bodily elements in emotions. This concept not only clarifies the relationship between the cognitive and bodily aspects of emotions but also offers a valuable framework for understanding the intentional focus and phenomenal nature of emotional experiences.

- (3) Adding an Acknowledgment section.

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Reference

1. Shutaleva, A. Epistemic Challenges in Neurophenomenology: Exploring the Reliability of Knowledge and Its Ontological Implications. *Philosophies* **2023**, *8*, 94. [[CrossRef](#)]

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