This article is devoted to the problem of political emigration in the Cold War period. This problem has been studied by a large group of intellectuals-thinkers, writers, and academics. The author of the article focuses on the individual strategies of sentiments among Central and Eastern European intellectuals. Their decisions were as much the result of an impulse and reaction to circumstances as the rational premise that the outside world was a place where they would be safer with their family and friends, and where they would not have to succumb to political pressure in their work and research. The author relies on conceptual developments among specialists in the field of the analysis of behavioral patterns of intellectuals. Particular attention is paid to the example of Adam Ulam, whose personality combined the specific features of emigrants from Russia and Eastern Europe. Much attention is paid to the theoretical and methodological aspects of the problem of intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe. The author analyzes the approaches of researchers to the problem of the formation of the Polish intelligentsia. As a result of the study, it has been shown that, during the Cold War, intellectuals were mobilized on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Some of them played an important role, such as in US Cold War strategies, especially within the so-called Cultural Cold War. Conclusions drawn from such study are of a more universal nature and allow one to pose a question about the specificity of the intellectual émigré as an important element of global intellectual history.

Keywords: intellectuals, Cold War, exile, Central Europe, East Europe, Polish émigrés

Статья посвящена проблеме политической эмиграции периода холодной войны. Эту проблему изучала большая группа интеллектуалов – мыслителей, писателей и ученых. Автор акцентирует внимание на индивидуаль-
ных стратегиях настроений интеллектуалов Центрального Востока. Их решения были в большей степени результатом импульса и реакции на обстоятельства, чем рациональной предпосылки, что внешний мир – это место, где они будут в большей безопасности со своей семьей и друзьями и где им не придется поддаваться политическому давлению в своей работе. Автор опирается на концептуальные разработки специалистов в области анализа моделей поведения интеллектуалов. Особое внимание уделено феномену Адама Улама, в личности которого соединились специфические черты эмигрантов из России и Восточной Европы. Подробно рассмотрены теоретико-методологические аспекты проблемы интеллектуалов Центральной и Восточной Европы. Проанализированы подходы исследователей к проблеме формирования польской интеллигенции. Доказано, что в годы холодной войны интеллектуалы были мобилизованы по обе стороны «железного занавеса». Некоторые из них сыграли важную роль, например, в стратегиях США времен холодной войны, особенно в рамках так называемой культурной холодной войны. Выводы такого исследования носят более универсальный характер и позволяют поставить вопрос о специфике интеллектуальной эмиграции как важного элемента мировой интеллектуальной истории.

Ключевые слова: интеллектуалы, холодная война, изгнание, Центральная Европа, Восточная Европа, польские эмигранты

Intellectual émigrés are not an easy subject of study. For example, their number in the entire mass of emigrants depends primarily on how we define this group. In the Polish, Central European and Russian tradition, the category of the so-called intelligentsia, with its traditions, history and social role is deeply ingrained. From this perspective, the history of intellectuals is nothing more than the history of the intelligentsia, i.e. the intellectual elite. They can be seen in the research conducted over a century ago by Tomasz Masaryk, recalled by David Kettler [Kettler, p. 204], and in Poland by Ryszarda Czepulis-Rastenis, Maciej Janowski, or Jerzy Jedlicki [Inteligencja polska pod zaborami; Janowski; Jedlicki, 2014]. Jedlicki even defines when exactly one can speak of intellectuals: “A scientist or an artist becomes an intellectual when, transgressing the boundaries of his specialty, he tries to acquire an influence on the minds and the conscience of his fellow–citizens, their moral views, cultural inclinations, social attitudes and political choices. That is, he becomes an intellectual when he endeavors, with his own freely voiced opinion – and not with the opinion of an expert who was asked for advice – to influence public life. In a word, the intellectual is a wise man or a fool who, as Sartre says, meddles in other people’s affairs” [Jedlicki, 1994, p. 102]. He sees intellectuals as a social elite, endowed with a unique gift of understanding and knowing the world, which – under certain conditions – may influence the views and behavior of others. In this approach, intellectuals are a group narrower than the intelligentsia itself. Meanwhile, in the European tradition, the term intellectual describes
exactly what in Poland and the surrounding region is called intelligentsia. In order to avoid misunderstandings and to stay closer to the meaning ranges commonly used in the English language, in this text I will use the terms *intellectuals* and *intelligentsia* interchangeably without getting caught up in the distinction proposed by Jedlicki.

Following the line of argument presented by Ryszarda Czepulis-Rastenis, and Jerzy Szacki, who repeated and developed her theses, from the nineteenth century Polish intelligentsia can be divided into two groups: *intelligentsia – socio-professional layer* and *intelligentsia – elite*. The difference between them was that the first group was identified by education and profession. Before the war, to be identified as a member of this group, it was sufficient to have graduated from secondary school or be an academic lecturer, teacher, engineer or doctor by profession. A special feature of the second group was its role “in shaping national consciousness and culture”. With time, this division ceased to correspond to reality and, according to Jerzy Szacki, “a Polish intellectual was more of a carrier of culture than of a performer of a specific profession” [Szacki, p. 366–367]. The fact that the numbers of the Polish intelligentsia increased before the Second World War was significant for its history, while the experience of occupation and exile became its characteristic feature. It was noticed by, among others, Krystyna Kersten, who from the perspective of the history of the Polish People’s Republic wrote about the Polish intellectual’s search for a place in the world, “in which he or she was born and grew up, from which he or she was uprooted by earthquakes caused by two totalitarian systems, alternately fighting, cooperating and finally who were engaged in a deadly battle. The Polish intellectual was literally uprooted, just like the intellectuals of Lviv and Vilnius, who were thrown by a wave of displacement to the West, as was the case with many scholars, writers, and journalists, who in a dramatic dilemma whether to return to the subordinate country ruled by communists or to remain in exile for an indefinite period, chose the exile. But also Polish intellectuals were uprooted from the cultural space, torn from the spiritual tissue in which they were immersed and which defined the framework of their existence” [Kersten, p. 100–101].

The émigré sociologist, Aleksander Gella, the author of a text devoted to the fate of the Polish intelligentsia in exile, claimed that this specific group, educated in the nineteenth century, was characterized by two factors: “education and acceptance of a specific system of values” [Gella, p. 157]. It translated into specific intellectual and moral obligations, such as honesty in thinking. The French thinker, Raymond Aron, expressed it in a similar way when writing after the war about intellectuals who betrayed their vocation. At the same time, he drew attention to the multitude of possible definitions of both the intelligentsia and an intellectual [Aron, p. 203–210], whom he understood himself as “the man of ideas and the man of science” [Ibid., p. 210], who was able “to transform opinions or interests into theories” within, for example, a political party [Ibid., p. 209].
Tony Judt, also wrote about their culture-forming role and the responsibility of intellectuals in modern history [Intellectuals].

**Intellectuals in exile as a methodological challenge**

In the above approaches, apart from Aleksander Gella’s proposal, little space is given to the question of the émigré experience of intellectuals or the role they played outside their home countries. Meanwhile, the study of migration sheds a lot of light on the history of the mind in general. Let us start with the fact that emigration of an intellectual means not only the migration of an individual, but also of an important set of ideas, beliefs and images. An intellectual “takes away” his or her mind, and with it a certain potential for thought and action. Some things related to this potential will not happen in his or her country anymore. But will they happen in exile? The decision of an intellectual has specific consequences for him or her individually, but also has a broader dimension and context. An intellectual can easily be accused of escaping the battlefields and, thus, by leaving his or her fellowmen, loses the moral right to instruct them. But is that true? The example of the Paris-based *Kultura* proves that it is not necessarily the case. The intellectual in exile still has an important role to play in relation to his or her home country. Under “normal” conditions, where the home country and the host country are neither at war nor in conflict, we can speak of the brain drain phenomenon, where the scientific and intellectual elite is *sucked out* by the host country, increasing its intellectual potential. An intellectual who decides to take part in such a process makes a conscious and voluntary decision, so the weakening of their ties with the home country is somehow a natural result of the decision to emigrate. It is different when the decision to emigrate is forced by circumstances and an intellectual leaves in spite of themselves. In this case, the emigrant does not intentionally say goodbye to the home country. This is one of the perspectives important for understanding the role of an intellectual in exile. During the Cold War, intellectuals were usually forced to travel, and what they did or wrote was often dictated by their memory and thinking about their home country that was the first injection of intellectual capital for them. It was there where they were influenced by their family, they received a basic upbringing and education, undertook the first readings that shaped their personality, imagination, and knowledge about the world. When they left, all this formative experience travelled with them. That is why, when talking about the migration of intellectuals, one must also talk about the migration of their minds, ideas-thoughts, imaginations, concepts – as well as the value systems, behavior patterns or institutional models embedded in them.

How to describe this movement of minds and ideas? An exemplary paradigm of such research is proposed by David Kettler: the starting point of exile, exile as event, locus of exile, project of exile, mission, and the end of exile. At the same time, he adds that his proposal is “a paradigm for the comparative study of political exile” [Kettler, p. 204]. However, such migration studies allow one to put ideas into context, show geography,
scale, interactions with systems, but do not deal with the ideas themselves. The intellectual history paradigm comes in handy, as it allows us to focus on the idea itself, its authors and context, although it does not deal with migrations as such. Nevertheless, within such paradigm, the wandering of ideas is considered, which is perfectly illustrated by two quotations from those classics of intellectual history, recalled by Edward Baring [Baring]. Artur Lovejoy, the father of contemporary history of ideas, recognized ideas to be “the most migratory things in the world” [Lovejoy, p. 4]. The migration of the idea, he postulated, does not only correspond with the scope of our research, but also with the direction in which intellectual history is heading today, which we can learn by reading the works by David Armitage on the international turn in intellectual history [Armitage, p. 1]. Although, in such a general approach, the essence of migration phenomena is lost and in the case of the history of ideas they belong to the context.

Meanwhile, combining the perspective of idea migration with the perspective of the migration of its creator is essential in our study. It allows us to juxtapose the circulation of ideas with the movement of their migrating carriers. Can ideas, like these migrant-carriers, be susceptible to pull and push factors? In other words, can certain ideas be pushed out of home countries, or attracted by target countries, cultures or intellectual communities operating in these states? What role do politics and political motivation play in this? Research on Cold War migrations shows that the structures created by political emigrants are of a trans-territorial nature. In various countries of settlement, there are similar forms of political activity or organizations, which only differ in terms of the regulations of the countries of settlement.

**Cold War: An Idea Snapshot at the Beginning of a Journey**

All of these considerations are necessary for understanding how intellectuals migrate with their ideas. As they settle down, they change what remains constant in them in relation to the beginning of the journey and their destination. In such a journey of an idea together with its creator or carrier, the starting point must be determined. Many of the intellectual journeys of the Cold War began much earlier, i.e. during the Second World War. Of course, not all intellectuals fled occupied countries. Some stayed, but their fate was often tragic, and particularly cruel, when the planned extermination of the intelligentsia occurred. The goal in these instances was to deprive the conquered nation of an elite. This was the purpose of the AB-Aktion conducted at the beginning of the war in the areas occupied by the German state, or the murder of Polish officers in Katyn, Kharkiv, and Mednoje by the Soviet state. Although these operations were not publicized during the war, and detailed knowledge of them was not available, it was obvious to intellectuals that under the rule of both the German NSDAP and the Soviet AUCP(b) their normal activity would not be possible. The atrocities that befell society as a whole were an additional argument for escaping as quickly as possible. If we add the ethnic factor to this – such
actions were aimed at specific nations: Jews, Poles, etc. – it becomes clear that many of them avoided death by escaping.

Scientific and intellectual life in the occupied countries of Central and Eastern Europe was destroyed. Institutions dealing with science, culture and education were closed, and even if they did operate, the number of professionals who could work within them decreased drastically. The operation of an underground education and presses was limited only to rudimentary forms. The emigration of intellectuals was not only aimed at saving lives, but also meant migration of certain institutional patterns, the education system, and world views – the migration that was to preserve these patterns. It is typical that, for example, in the new wave of Polish emigrants who reached the USA during the war, its intellectual character was visible, and is comparable with earlier waves [Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann]. Under the new conditions, intellectuals performed military and diplomatic service, as well as engaged in political activities. They made attempts to rebuild educational and scientific associations abroad. From the point of view of the home country, any potential resources available before the war were weakened and split in half. But even this substitute of intellectual life was designed to preserve a potential one in exile, which could be returned to Poland after the end of war.

For such potential to be conserved, it was necessary to cooperate with the countries of settlement and adapt to new conditions and new rules of the game. This willingness to adapt related to both legal and formal issues, such as setting up a scientific association, which was different in Great Britain, France, and the USA, as well as interactions with the existing scientific institutions and the wider intellectual environment in these countries. Interactions with intellectuals from other European countries who emigrated were equally important. From this point of view, two places were particularly significant – London and New York, where the largest groups of these intellectuals found their way. Their primary concern was the post-war condition of science, research practice and intellectual reflection, but also what shape post-war Europe and the world would take. The key question: What role should intellectuals play in order to prevent similar tragedies in the future? Such projects of reconstruction are among the most important intellectual achievements of this period; they were the foundation for the reconstruction of the collective security system and gave rise to the processes of European integration.

However, for many emigrant intellectuals, their goals could still not be realized after the war. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe found themselves under Soviet influence, and, thus, many of the emigrants decided not to return to their home countries, as they understood that they would expose themselves and their relatives to repression, and their intellectual freedom would be threatened. For them, the military mission was over, but a new émigré mission had begun [Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann]. Only a few intellectuals decided to return to their homelands, assuming that even under Soviet domination it was possible to rebuild the country.
The scale of this phenomena was different in a number of key cases, including the Baltic countries, which were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union, and Poland, where only a part of the political elite returned, only to discover that there was no place for them in the new system. These two examples can be further contrasted with Czechoslovakia, where in the first post-war years almost the entire émigré elite returned to the country to hand over power to the communist government in 1948. These political changes generated new waves of emigrants, including intellectuals, which came in response to the next major political crises witnessed in 1956, 1968 or 1980. Independent intellectuals felt constantly threatened and saw their escape to the West as a natural choice and a justified gesture of opposition.

The effect of these new waves of emigration included reconstructing the map of intellectual migration. In addition to the aforementioned centers of London and New York, the list of important places for intellectual discussions included Paris and Munich, but also prominent university towns in Europe and North America where emigrants sought employment. Australia was quite a distant place where emigrant intellectuals also found their way, although the potential accumulated there applied only to individuals such as Jerzy Zubrzycki, rather than entire intellectual émigré communities.

In the bipolar world that emerged after the Second World War, since the potential of émigré intellectuals could not be used in communist states, it was quickly recognized as an important weapon during the Cold War. Primarily, the development of this potential was undertaken by an institution financed by the USA: the Free Europe Committee (FEC). Emigrants had a chance to survive in exile and to participate in activities they believed to be right. Thus, they became an important element of weaponry used during the Cultural Cold War [Stonor Saunders]. On both sides of the Iron Curtain there was a battle for minds, with intellectuals as the main weapon. In 1948, the World Congress of Intellectuals in Defense of Peace was held in Wrocław, and in response, the Western countries called the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Berlin two years later. Important journals were created, financed by the FEC such “Encounter”, “Der Monat”, “Preuves”, “Soviet Survey”, “Kultura” and Radio Free Europe was launched. After 1956, the methods changed – the publishing of émigré books and their shipment to countries behind the Iron Curtain were financed and powerful academic exchange programs were launched, in which, among others, the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, private individuals and church structures were engaged. The history of Cold War intellectual exchange seen from this perspective is a topic worth studying in itself.

Case study – Adam Ulam, Harvard, Russian and Polish émigrés

The above framework can be used, for example, to support research into the emigration of intellectual biographies. I would like to propose Adam Ulam as an example. Ulam was born in 1922 and left Poland at the age of 17. An attempt to portray his mind at the time he and his brother made the decision to leave might look like the following: He came from an assimilated
Jewish family. This factor was significant in the pre-war Polish state, where scholars of the caliber of Stanisław Ulam, an outstanding mathematician, developed their careers outside Poland mainly because their colleagues were shaken by incidents directed against the Jews [Urbanek]. While, in pre-war Poland, Ulam's Jewish heritage was stigmatized, during the war, and especially under German occupation, it could result in a death sentence. Thus, leaving the country on the eve of the fighting probably saved his life, as evidenced by the fate of his family, almost all of them perishing, including his father and sister [Ulam, 2002, p. 93]. Characteristically, however, Adam Ulam, although aware of his Jewish origin, manifested his attachment to his Polish roots and culture. His studies at Brown University laid severe stress on him as he was separated from his family – especially his father who stayed in Poland – while he also struggled financially. Ulam completed a full cycle of higher education at the American university and today it would be challenging to make a distinction between its effects from what was still the result of his early education in Poland. Nevertheless, it is telling that one of his first published texts concerns Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski, "the most notable political author of the sixteenth-century Poland" – it was undoubtedly Modrzewski's *Polish* contribution to American scholarship that was important to Ulam [Ulam, 1946, p. 93].

Graduating from Brown University in 1947 with his doctoral degree, Ulam then took up employment at Harvard University, which consolidated his position as a great scholar and expert on the Soviet Union. Did his education in Poland influence his research interests, as well as the way he conducted it? It appears that this early period of study was decisive in Ulam's intellectual development, though it is also worth posing the question of whether it was more specifically pre-war conversations with his family and friends that sparked his interest in Russia? Undoubtedly, the direction of interest was also influenced by the demand articulated by the American academy and the US government. Even during the war, and immediately thereafter, the first professors from Central and Eastern Europe found employment at American universities, such as New York's Fordham University, the New School for Social Research, and New York University. The Cold War period generated an even greater demand for specialists from this part of the world, and there are many examples of university emigrants’ careers. One of the most interesting cases is Harvard University, where Waclaw Lednicki lectured during the Second World War and in the first five years thereafter several other eminent names appeared, such as Adam Ulam, Richard Pipes, Marian Kamil Dziewanowski, Zbigniew Brzeziński and Wiktor Weintraub. Richard Pipes was awarded his doctoral degree from Harvard University in 1950 and, over time, became one of the most recognizable historians of the Soviet Union. From 1968 to 1973, he headed the Harvard Russian Research Center, and in the early 1980s, he even became President Ronald Reagan's security adviser. Marian Kamil Dziewanowski, received his Harvard doctorate just a year after Pipes and would go to author, among others, books on the history of the Communist Party of Poland, as well as the textbook *History of Soviet Russia*. Dziewanowski
later lecturer at Boston College, Boston University, and then the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukkee. Finally, in 1953, Zbigniew Brzeziński received his PhD, again from Harvard, and in 1960 he took up employment at Columbia University. In the late 1970s, he became a security advisor to President Jimmy Carter. All of these scholars not only had the opportunity to work at the Russian Research Center, but also received education from prominent scholars like Merle Fainsod and the Russian émigré, Michael Karpovich. Only Weintraub found his way to Harvard University already as a recognized professor of the history of Slavic literature.

As experts in the region who knew foreign languages and understood Russia, they were exceptionally valuable at the onset of the Cold War. It is worth emphasizing the shift in dominance of Soviet studies by emigrants from Central and Eastern Europe, where emigrants from Russia also played an important role. Michael Karpovich was key in developing Russian Studies at Harvard University and establishing the Russian Research Center [Filipowicz]. His contemporaries acknowledged that he was largely shaped by the experience of emigration. Marian Kamil Dziewanowski appreciated Karpovich’s kindness towards Poles. He believed that his strength lay not so much in scientific publications as in his enormous erudition, endearing personality and organizational skills [Dziewanowski, p. 229–233]. It was Russian studies he was developing, from research conducted before and during the Second World War, that laid a solid foundation for the expansion of Soviet studies in the late 1940s. What is more, Karpovich did not only teach at Harvard University – he supervised many American experts on Russia and Soviet Russia who, after studying at Harvard, worked in other academic centers in the USA. The extensive list of former students includes Philip Mosely, Marc Raeff, Nicolas Riasanovsky, Donald Treadgold and Martin Malia [Filipowicz, p. 217–218]. Following the advice of Waclaw Lednicki – a professor of literature at Harvard University between 1940–1944, and then later based at the University of California at Berkeley – Karpovich invited Wiktor Weintraub to Harvard in 1950 [Weintraub, p. 30–31].

What could Karpovich’s students learn from him? In his texts, he explored various aspects of the history of Russia, but – as Martin Malia mentions – “Karpovich had two main themes which nurtured and motivated all of his writings and teaching: Russia as part of European civilization and revolution” [Zeide, p. 249]. He was convinced that over time Russia would not only come closer to the West, but would be equally civilized. He was concerned with the viability of myths in politics, and their other use in democratic states like the USA and totalitarian states like the Soviet Union. Adam Ulam also attended Karpovich’s classes. Although he did not mention him in his memoirs, in an earlier book about the crisis of the American academy, he wrote very clearly how much he owed to people like Karpovich. Criticizing the extremes that tainted American Kremlinology, he wrote: “we were saved from such extravagances and stultifying stereotypes very largely through the presence in the academic world then of a veritable handful of distinguished scholars in the field of Russian history. They had been teaching and writing
for some time, of course, but it is now in this educational emergency that they exerted crucial and beneficial influence. <…> One of the handful was Professor Michael Karpovich of Harvard. Those who studied directly under him would undoubtedly credit with much more than just saving Russian studies from the faults of false exoticism and excessive utilitarianism. His very personality exemplified and emanated some of the best characteristics of the pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia, a deep impression of civilized humanity and intellectual liveliness, a strong liberal bias yet free of that dogmatism which made so many Russian intellectuals of that period go astray (in a manner reminiscent, alas, of so many of our own). His favored field was that of nineteenth-century Russian intellectual history...

It required great erudition and firm intellectual balance to guide both the future specialist and the general student safely through a subject so full of pitfalls of false enthusiasm and facile generalization, to see its organic connection with, at the same time as significant differences from, the general current of Western culture. Again, one feels that the value of this unhurried, unsensational approach transcended its benefits to the future writer of a doctoral dissertation, or a non-specialist's enhanced pleasure in reading a Russian novel. One learned to understand a great nation and its tragic history in a way that no recital of political facts and economic statistics could furnish by itself. And quite beyond and apart from Russia, one learned to understand, which is what education is all about” [Ulam, 1972, p. 34–36]. From this excellent characterization, it is clear how much Ulam owes not only to Karpovich himself, but also to his classes. Ulam was convinced that they had been equally fruitful for a whole generation of specialists in Russian studies. And to a large extent it was also a clear plan of Karpovich himself as a Russian émigré – to provide Western students with a proper understanding of Russia and its history. His is an interesting example that perfectly illustrates the two-phase flow of knowledge forced by emigration – first from post-revolutionary Russia, and then from Poland during the war. Karpovich was an element of this first phase, as Zeide noted: “The transfer of knowledge and attitude constituted an important part of what I referred to as a crusade. Karpovich taught in the atmosphere of intensified confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union, and the latter was very much present in his lectures, whatever evidence to the contrary some insist on” [Zeide, p. 256]. It is also a great example of what, behind the sociology of ideas, we would describe as the production of ideas, and Ulam would be largely the product of this production process.

Ulam was part of a larger phenomenon and he was well aware of the intellectual masters that had shaped him. The education he received at prestigious American universities was invariably essential to his future career. His older fellow emigrants, such as Wiktor Sukiennicki, did not have this advantage and could not wish for a similar career path. In half a century of active work as a Sovietologist, Ulam published 20 books on the subject and became an important expert, invited by academic, military and government institutions to explain the intricacies of the Soviet mentality, thinking and politics.
In 1973–1976 and 1980–1992, he was the director of the Russian Research Center, observing the strength of human rights defenders, Gorbachev's rise to power, perestroika, and the collapse of the Soviet Union – the subject of his research. He was also a lecturer at Harvard University for many years and became mentor to his students as much as Karpovich was to him.

Geographically, Ulam's intellectual journey seems to be not too complicated. After completing his education in pre-war Lviv, he lived in Boston for the rest of his life, or rather in Cambridge, Massachusetts, with a stopover in Providence. It was not an extensive, multi-stage journey, but its intellectual significance cannot be overestimated. Both pre-war Lviv as an intellectual center and post-war Boston were unique clusters of outstanding minds. Another map is a map of networks that Ulam had already been creating in the USA. What elements of these networks relate to pre-war Lviv, pre-war Poland, or its substitutes that ended up in exile? Did they serve as an important point of reference to his intellectual development already in the US, or were they just a faint memory? These questions arise in the article about Frycz Modrzewski – where did this topic come from and why was it not developed in later years? These questions also concern the review and citation network that illustrate Ulam's growing position in the American academic and expert world. Each of his books attracted a lot of attention, none went unnoticed – just enumerating them would take a large part of this article. Finally, the peer and mentoring networks formed by Ulam seem important, especially when linking him to other Sovietologists and then his students. What was the role of émigré intellectuals in this puzzle? This is an exemplary list of questions that require research and are a proposal to apply the previous theoretical framework in this case. Studies in this context will help us to better understand what factors influenced his choice of research interests from Frycz Modrzewski, through British socialism and on to various aspects of the Soviet world.

But an equally important question relates to the significance of the émigré experience in his intellectual biography. Was Ulam part of the second phase of the émigré knowledge transfer between Russia and Europe and the USA or did he belong to the first phase just like Karpovich? Karpovich at the time of his emigration was already an adult and intellectual, unlike Ulam, who came to the USA as a teenage boy. Probably, the USA shaped his thinking about an academic career to a greater extent than pre-war Poland. But did it shape his thinking about Russia? Was he more beholden to family talks, the climate of the Cold War during which his brother built a hydrogen bomb, or a full-blown student of Karpovich? Did he see – like Karpovich – an important role for himself as an émigré in convincing American students of his vision of Russia, which was also shaped by the experience of emigration? It seems that each of these factors shaped Ulam to some extent, and it would be difficult to grasp the which element was more significant.

It would be even more interesting to compare the biography of Marian Kamil Dziewanowski with that of Karpovich’s – when the former emigrated, he was 26, whereas when he started his studies at Harvard University, he was 34.
Dziewanowski, like Karpovich, was already a grown man, but he had to study for a few more years to be able to think about a university career which, in fact, he only started when he was already forty. For Dziewanowski, emigration was undoubtedly a much more important factor in his work than for Ulam. Even his selection of topics, including Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, the history of the Communist Party of Poland, and the federal policy of Józef Piłsudski, would bring American readers closer to Polish matters, and remained so dear to the author. His story of Soviet Russia was written along the way and had the character of a more popular work of non-fiction based on academic synthesis; it drew from Soviet studies rather than constituted an essential part of them. But Dziewanowski, like Ulam, was one of Karpovich’s students. Did the latter manage to convince both of them that the history of Russia was not unique and resembled the histories of other European countries? Was he attempting to uproot from Western thinking the belief in Russian uniqueness part of his “tireless fight against any kind of maximalism, nationalism, eschatological theories, and, particularly, messianism” – and was it sufficiently convincing? [Zeide, p. 256–261].

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By examining and comparing those experts on Russia, the Soviet Union and twentieth-century communism who took up employment at Harvard University in the post-war period, it is clearly visible how their émigré experience intertwined with the ideas they devoted themselves to and the world in which they lived, and how they all influenced each other. On the surface, the story that emerges resembles many other biographical stories. However, the combination of intellectual history, the sociology of ideas and the study of migration allows us to look at biographies from a slightly different angle and to bring out hitherto invisible shades.

It must also be said that the given example is only a modest attempt to approach a much wider topic – the image of the potential and intellectual production of emigrant intellectuals during the Cold War. We know that though the total number is unclear, a large group of intellectuals found themselves in the West during and after the Second World War. In this bipolar world, intellectuals were mobilized on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Some of them played an important role, such as in US Cold War strategies, especially within the so-called Cultural Cold War. The exile created room for transnational projects, cooperation, and emergence of such concepts as the federation of East Central Europe, the future enlargement of the European integration process, and reconciliation between former enemies, such as ULB concept, Polish-Russian and Polish-German relations. Intellectuals were in contact with their counterparts in communist countries, which in the long run affected the communist system in the form of discussions of Marxism between Schaff, Jordan, and Kolakowski, and in the distribution of their works.

Still, the geography of their intellectual developments and encounters remains to be told. Minds traveling with their ideas and intellectual
frameworks, put into the specific context of the Cold War, produced an expert knowledge conditioned by the demands and circumstances of their times. Merging intellectual history with sociology of ideas and literary criticism would generate a new view of it all. The particular example of Sovietology, born at Harvard University with émigrés like Michael Karpovich and Adam Ulam, shows how important their native experience and proficiency in Eastern European languages were for building the expertise for which Harvard was famous during the whole Cold War. Intellectual biographies with their professional and personal networks are still to be reconstructed and restored as an important element of Cold War exile history combined with transatlantic intellectual exchange.

**Список литературы**


References

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