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THINKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND PHILOSOPHY: NEW PERSPECTIVES OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY

«La philosophie – «ce mode de pensée qui se situe entre la religion et la science » comme dit Bertrand Russell – semble être entrée dans une crise fondamentale, la plus sérieuse de toute son histoire. Attaquée de tous côtés par les diverses disciplines scientifiques, elle s'est vu contester les domaines traditionnels que lui avaient assignés les Grecs. A son tour, elle se tourne vers de nouveaux champs de recherche: le bien-fondé de la toute-puissance scientifique, la signification de l'histoire, la réflexion sur la sémiologie et la linguistique, l'esthétique...»1.

Abstract. It can be considered that the main source of faith in many thinkers lies in the great enigma of the origin of the Universe, the matter, that in all rigor current science is incapable of solve. Scientific activity in its most advanced forms, and the most elaborate concerns only the transformations of matter, once it is there as a datum, a raw existent. She therefore, this activity is entirely situated below the great mystery. And the two conceivable attitudes in this respect are, in terms of philosophical, options of principle.

Faced with the relativism that seems to dominate contemporary epistemology, the effort to distinguish the scientific approach from the reality of religious and philosophical approaches may seem reckless and outmoded. Yet it is an urgent task if we want to avoid the banal «All is good» that places all forms of knowledge at the same level of uncertainty and confusion. How to distinguish religious spirit, scientific spirit and philosophical thought in order to fully understand the respective scope and their limits? There is a lucid conception of human knowledge. This article attempts to provide an interdisciplinary answer to the difficult question of the originality of the scientific reflection through the examination of the main currents of thought that have crossed the epistemology, mainly in the twentieth century. The article is an attempt of exploring the possible ways to address the question of meaning and truth via an interdisciplinary approach of Science (answering the question of How and addresses facts), Philosophy (trying to answer the question of Why?) and Religion (answering Ultimate questions, values) by exposing the epistemological limits, the objects and the methods of scrutinizing human experience and the reality as a whole We still remember that Einstein clearly stated that «Science without religion is lame; religion without science is blind»2. Does it make sense to philosophically re-think the nature of the relation between Science and Religion? What is the situation of the philosophy of religion today? What about the relation between science and philosophy? These are essential questions addressed human intelligence and questioning both the totality of his experience, culture and of his presence-in- the-world, and how he makes sense of nature and his understanding of the world. What are today the areas of possible interdisciplinary re-conciliation between the ideal of philosophy, religion and science as differential modes expression of our understanding of reality as such?

Keywords: philosophy, religion, science, culture, interdisciplinary.

Pretending to try to see a little more clearly within the different approaches of the reality of religious, scientific and philosophical aims and trying to distinguish them from each other may seem today a reckless enterprise so much the epistemological ground looks so mined and complex. Following Paul Feyerabend [22], radical relativism seems to dominate the field of philosophy of science to the point of inviting participants at the colloquium on the sociology of scientific knowledge (university of Paris–Sorbonne, 21–22 January 1993) to question: Is relativism resistible? [12].

This psychological relativism, social and historical at the same time, happens to be the result of a slow erosion that led throughout the twentieth century to question the value and certainty of science; as if, after the scientific temptation of the nineteenth century, a kind of counter-certainty had to lead to the most radical skepticism testified by the polemic of Feyerabend and Lakatos in 1970.

The generally accepted thesis can be summarized in the consensual formula «Everything is good», in the sense of «All is worth». The scientific discourse whether inductive or deductive, empirical or theoretical, has no more legitimacy to account for the reality than religious prophecy or representation of the world that everyone conveys in the depths of oneself. The theoretical superstructure of the myth caps the reality with as much force and veracity as science. Philosophical systems, religious dogmas, scientific doctrines all propose models accounting for the

multiplicity of reality in one organized totality [22, p. 334]. As equivalent «paradigms» (Kuhn, 1972), they find their birth in a social, historical, psychological, cultural, linguistic that allows to render in full account. No one should claim more certainty than others.

In such a conventional perspective, it is the idea of claiming any universal and rational truth which falls into the rank of opinion (*doxa*) and circumstantial humor; epistemology dissolves into mainstream sociology; the philosophy of science is only an ideological outbidding; the scientific project of possible certainty in the objective approach of reality is reduced to a subjective illusion without any particular legitimacy.

As we can see, the question is at the same time that of the legitimacy of science in the claim to truth and that of its distinction from the other discourses that seek to account for the reality. It is not a question of whether this or that science is independent of the socio-historical conditions in which it has taken birth (no representation of the world exists outside of a precise local and temporal context), but to find out if it is still possible to distinguish with relevance the activity of the scientist, the spirit with which he conducts his investigation, other activities of the mind, religious or philosophical, or if it is advisable to drown all the representations in a radical indistinction. Is it still legitimate to draw a line of demarcation, even changeable, between the religious spirit, the scientific spirit and philosophical spirit? Should we, on the contrary, confuse them? The question is important; it brings forth the autonomy of scientific thought, but also that of religious thought and that of philosophical criticism.

A. The Absolute Relativism.

If, starting from nowadays triumphant so-called cultural relativism, inherited from the historicism of the early twentieth century, we understand by knowledge in general, any more or less all-encompassing concept of the world, more or less precise, more or less systematic by refusing to distinguish between these various forms of knowing, one is led to a kind of cognitive agnosticism. Indeed, none of any being is entitled to the least singular privilege, all representations are equivalent. At least, nothing can enable their radical distinction.

Each of them would have their own representation of the world³ (*Weltanschauung*); every era, every people, ultimately each individual would produce one or more doctrines more or less compatible with a power of conviction only noticeable from the inside. Each culture would close on itself like a sort of autonomous idiom, idiolect reflecting for itself only an original conception of the world. Any comparison would be reckless; what to say then of the least attempt to hierarchy?

Science, religion, philosophy, everything is equivalent since everything is reflective of a singular conception of the world and that the criteria that would make it possible to distinguish them are themselves culturally located.

Moreover, far from being asked as raw data, these conceptions are multiple and determined in their multiplicity even by their singular position in the universe; they appear at given times in the time, in particular geographical areas; they do not possess any intrinsic necessity. They are equivalent visions of the world, particular, transients, various: the very opposite of the claim to objectivity and the universal rationality that science presupposes.

It is then easy to slip to the aphorism that made a fortune thanks to the theater of Pirandello: «To each his truth», in the sense of: to each his own vision of the world, to each his ideas. There is no knowing that would win by an effort of rigor and universal aim; there is no truth in the singular, nor as given, nor even as an ideal regulative goal of intellectual research.

To tell the truth, this opinion is very old since Socrates is already fighting among some sophists, such as the famous Protagoras, whom he reminds than: «Man is the measure of all things: of the things that are, that they are, of the things that are not, that they are not⁴» that man himself is still «Measured by the being of meanings». The extreme Protagorean vision combined with historicism and sociology leads, brought up to date, to the culturalist hypothesis of Charles Taylor [12]: every people, every time would have their general conception of life. Philosophies, sciences, religions are all just singular conceptions equivalent to place in various ideological registers. Their coefficient of certainty is the same. Not only do they place themselves at the same level of interpretation of the universe, but we have no cognitive tools to distinguish the validity of their respective approaches to reality. Each system folds on itself and is only worth it to its own coherence. No extrinsic approach can pierce the bark. Science itself, despite its victories, must to fall back on its claims to the universal. It is just an idol of the Western culture, neither more nor less reliable than any myth that is studied by the ethnologist or historian of religion [10]. Finally, following this relativism, it is no longer possible to distinguish between science and pseudoscience, the religion of sectarian dogmatism, the philosophy of verbal delirium. What is the value of this condemnation of all claims to the universal, starting from any sort of conceptual effort to distinguish different types of representations of the world?

B. The Relativistic Aporia.

For obvious and seductive it seems, this suspension of any universal project in terms of truth is debatable. In his reductive presentation and isolationist, relativism contains a serious intimate contradiction that ruin the very hypothesis.

Indeed, stating «To each his truth» or, which equals to «Everything is worth» is exposing oneself to seeing the universality of the formula falling within the scope of the relativism it professes. «Everything is relative» certainly, except the affirmation which, in its form, presents itself as an affirmation claiming a universal truth; «To each his truth», except precisely the maxim itself which states a valid truth for all and in all times.

Relativism supposes that the observer can exceed the condition on which he claims to reduce all other possible observers. All «makes sense» and all meanings are equivalent; the latter formulation, more modern, of the same relativism of principle is given for absolutely true, valid for all men, while denying contradictorily that one can claim the universality of judgment.

In this radical incompatibility lies the first difficulty, epistemological and logical at the same time, of all relativism. Everything is happening if the universal claim to the truth was banned, placing all the representations of the world at the same level of uncertainty, stating that these representations are all related to contingent realities that go beyond and account for it, but without ever questioning the correctness of this very statement.

However, the relativistic representation remains as well a representation among other representations. Where does it get this epistemological privilege that makes it claim to be the absolute one? The negation of hope that the human mind can aim for a possible universal truth always poses, contradictorily, that there is at least one knowledge that encompasses the entire science in its truth, which transcends and embraces the other visions of the world, its own, posited as valid for all. Everything is equivalent except the statement «All is worth», which remains an indissolubly universal formula and categorical, meaning necessary. The difficulty lies in the contradiction that is not explicit and therefore not overcome between the universality of the argumentative form and the radical skepticism of the content that makes it impossible by right.

As noted by philosophers as far apart as Karl Mannheim (1956) on the historicism of Karl Marx, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1967) about sociologism, Edmund Husserl [27] about the culturalism of Dilthey or Jose Ortega y Gasset (1988) in the case of skepticism in general, all generalized relativism only reproduces, moving it from one field of knowledge to another, the problem of its own coherence and its own veracity.

In all these cases, we find ourselves in front of one of the subtle arguments of Eubulidus, disciple of Euclid of Megara, known under the name of «paradox of the liar»: Epimenides the Cretan states that «all Cretans are liars». If he is telling the truth then he is a liar because he is Cretan and then he does not tell the truth; which leads to an aporia.

This paradox has the merit of showing that any proposition implies that one distinguishes between the enunciation, the conditions of its expression and its content. In any case, the one who pronounces this sentence distinguishes between truth and formulation since it presupposes, in order to be understood, the possible access at some impersonal level of knowing who is deciding the lie of the truthfulness and which defines science in its own concern for objectivity: a knowledge that allows to leave subjectivity because it is valid for all reasonable men. Anyone trying to write against reason are always curiously great reasoners. As for those who are fighting against the method, they often argue with rigor and consistency, as does precisely Feyerabend [22].

In this sense Raymond Bayer [5, p. 293] was able to see in the Protagoras of Plato the founding dialogue of the scientific exigency as hope of access to a knowledge that would not be worth especially for this or that, in this or that circumstance, but which allows an agreement beyond subjective diversities. Beyond the descriptive human singularity, the most extreme relativism therefore postulates this universality for every thinking being, reference that allows one to legitimize one's own speech as a veracious speech. The history of philosophy will seek this universal in things, in God, in human reason, in language; Kant will see an «a priori» of any episteme [29], Galileo attempted to base it in nature [23]. The more aggressive relativism, the most assertive skepticism always implicitly postulates its own objectivity as a condition of possibility of its claim to truth.

If we apply to contemporary relativism the criteria for disqualification that it applies to the sciences and that it sets up itself, then it falls under the blows of its own weapons: arbitrary, socially located, irrational, psychologically suspect, culturally determined, it is just like all other representations of the world. If not, we are entitled to ask it the question: from where does it draw its claim to occupy a veracious objective point of view? Paradoxically, its criticism of reason can't prevent it from inviting justification sometimes talkative, otherwise of wanting to be explicitly rational.

C. The Disciplinary fragmentation.

What is there in common between Platonic idealism and contemporary Anglo-Saxon empiricism? Between the paradoxes of the school of Megara and the Husserl's phenomenology? So much diversity in purpose, intent and method does not help to identify any univocity. At first glance, here relativism still seems to be right; philosophy comes on the form of various doctrines, disparate, conflictual till exclusion. Which unit could well underlie this multiplicity and deserve a common name? This fragmentation applies equally to singular science. What is it between the so-called «hard» sciences, strictly inductive or hypothetic-deductive, and the other sciences, to «softness» ever more or less suspicious? What right to combine astrophysics and linguistics under the same term? What is the identity between Euclid's Elements and Boole's Laws of Thought where it is explicitly stated that «it is not the essence of mathematics to deal with ideas and numbers» [11, p.15]?

This diversity is the same for religion that is given throughout history and anthropology in multiple forms that range from polytheist immanentism with the most transcendent monotheism, from morality tolerant to the most brutal exclusion [6]. What common points to find between the warlike polytheism of the Greeks, the worship of the dead in modern Shintoism and Haitian voodoo? Alain already noted that between agricultural religions, political religions and the monotheistic abstraction of the three religions of the Book (Judaism, Christianity and Islam),

the differences are more sensitive than analogies [1]. There would be as many sciences as scientists, religions and individual forms of faith, of philosophies than of pretended philosophers. Impossible therefore, to seek the least unity in these various fields, and even less to try to compare them in order to understand the specificity of each of their approaches to the reality.

D. The Desire to Know: The quiddity of any Human Experience.

Whether it is in poetic or descriptive form, whether it is dominantly Speculative or pragmatic, whether it is thinking of reaching a complete achieved explanation or remains at the stage of anxious questioning, the requirement to break through the secret of the universe, that is, the desire to tidy up the totality of being in its intelligible order, seems well at the outset of any speculative human knowledge and experience.

This radical aim tends to unify in the same representation the whole of all that is, including the knowing human subject, to give meaning to reality, and hence to existence. From the outset, the intention appears to be truly satisfactory only if we succeed in unifying all the knowledge in the construction of an intellectual system embracing, coordinating, prioritizing the totality of phenomena in a coherent and rational whole. Whether it postulates the possibility of going back to a single principle as highlighted Parmenides or many like Heraclitus, whether it admits the materiality of elements like Leucippus and Democritus or their only mathematical ideality as Pythagoras, whether it dares a metaphysical leap like Thales or refuses to go beyond the observation of natural regularities such as Empedocles, the temptation of understanding the universe seems well characterized by an exigency of careful thought in discovering the stable order behind moving diversity of appearances.

At this level, the scholar, the religious and the philosopher are still confused. They obey a radical and common speculative dissatisfaction in front of the way in which being is manifested in its unstable and changing diversity. Expressions at the beginning indistinct of a single need to understand, science, religion and philosophy seek, under the generic name of wisdom, to guess what hides under the uncertain appearances of the world (Robin, 1963). Eudoxe of Cnidus purposely gives himself the mission of «saving the whole phenomena»: building a model linking appearances from the sky into a coherent astronomical discourse, but above all, in a strong sense, account for the visible universe in such a way that nothing of what is observed is sacrificed by remaining unexplained.

Sciences, philosophies, religions seem to be rooted in the same desire of building a complete explanatory model of the field of observables. It is wonder, the astonishment and the dissatisfaction which invite questioning, to seek and to reflect. Plato, in *The Republic*, opposes in this sense the «philarchos», friend of power, and the «philokerdes», the one who seeks wealth, social success to «philomatès», the one who likes to understand, the friend of knowledge, greedy to learn as he distinguishes the «episteme» that invites theoretical knowledge, the «technè» that commits to the practical action to modify the given natural. In the *Theaetetus* he brings together wonder, astonishment, the spirit of paradox and sees in these attitudes the source of all intellectual research. Aristotle, at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* (A. 982 b.12), resumes this idea: Iris is daughter of Thaumás (*Theaetetus*, 155 d). The ideal of the scientist and philosopher is built on a religious metaphor.

Does it make sense again, here, to get to this indistinct starting point to justify a confusion of domains? In reality, it's not because science, religion and philosophy start from a similar origin and merge at the beginning that we need to move from this common source and some overlaps of domains, to a confusion of method, approach and spirit.

E. Doubt and Faith.

Although the religious attitude has in common with the philosophical attitude the search for a system of the world prioritizing all realities in order to understand the meaning and live better, it differs in several essential points.

First, whether immanent or transcendent, religion proposes an absolute truth that seeks authentic wisdom. It is not a matter more or less anxious aim for a possible coherence, but of a dogma, that is to say of a knowledge given for guarantee by revelation or any other traditional or charismatic way, certain, unmistakable.

«Everything can be changed except the Koran!» Says a Somali proverb. This intangible character of sacred dogma remains true of the book as of tradition oral. The content of doctrine can be said religious from the moment when its truth is posited as absolute. If it is sacrilege to question it, then religion sees itself out of reach of critical discussions. Here, faith overrides doubt.

It will be objected that many philosophers and scholars are bounded by a sort of dogmatizing temptation. But that does not prove the critical spirit of philosophy or the obsession against the scholar's proof; it only shows that it is easy to confuse the realms and to slip involuntarily philosophical or scientific towards that of the prophetic. One thing is certain; the prohibition to questioning an idea is the very opposite of the philosophical attitude for which the idea of the sacred remains a concept like others. One can be philosopher and religious without confusing those activities. St. Augustine and St. Thomas give the example of this double belonging. We cannot be both at the same time in the confusion without risk of darkness as seen with the ideas of "goddess reason" during the Revolution of 1789, from the end of history to the nineteenth century, or the so-called "mathematical" proof of the existence of God [18, 29]. Saying so, we want to mean that reason and faith are to different but complementary modes of addressing the reality and approaching being. They do not exclude each other systematically or are not immediately opposable

ontologically. The complexity of reality is such that we need to a multidisciplinary approach to investigate such questions by thinking with a Nietzschean style, that is to say going beyond binarism and Manicheism.

However, there is an obvious difference between the philosophical spirit and the religious one, at least by the characteristics of those realm of knowledge. In philosophy, all is like to be criticized, to be submitted to falsification and test (Karl Popper), doubt (Descartes) is the beginning of any philosophical enterprise, Criticism, as well the criticism of the critique itself is allowed.

From this critical point of view, the scientific spirit seems closer to the philosophical spirit than of the religious one. No sacred authority should neither hinder the investigation towards certainty: Karl Popper, in 1919, addresses the question of the possible limits to the refutation of any theory. He particularly raises the problem of the dividing line between sciences and other totalizing discourses (metaphysics, myths, etc.). When can a theory be given a scientific status? Is there a rigorous criterion for establishing the scientific nature of a theory? Observation, prediction, experience are not enough. It exists indeed a devastating pseudo-empiricism in astrology and many «experiments» are just testimonials without consistency or rigor, to the dressing illusory mathematics. Karl Popper sees in the idea of «refutability» (1973) the distinctive criterion of scientific discourse: a statement, a theory is truly scientific only if it is likely to be put back into question, to re-question.

Scientific discourse remains essentially hypothetical. Far to be reduced to a mere passive recording of experimental data, it is of the order of conjecture and is maintained only until nothing comes to invalidate its validity (Popper, 1985). Bertrand Russell reminds from his side that science always retains «a temporary character: it expects that modifications of his current theories sooner or later become necessary, and realizes that his method is logically unable to arrive to a complete and definitive demonstration» (1971: 12). In this sense, never a scientific theory should think itself being definitively established.

The irrevocable and eternal are not of the order of science, and less of philosophy, always in quest for endless foundations. Subsequently, Popper will refuse to psychoanalysis and Marxism the status of Science. This is, in their case, totalizing speeches that claim to be able to provide an explanation of everything, even and perhaps most importantly, any possible refutation of their explanatory model, thereby denying their scientific character.

A second criterion seems to associate scientific and philosophical to the religious spirit. It affects the very status of people as well as the form of the rational argumentation implied by the idea of demonstration.

F. The Dialectics of Faith and Proof.

In any religion, it is necessary to distinguish between elected subjects and spaces and sacred times as opposed to secular domains and to people laymen [21]. Prophets, priests, pastors, shamans, imams appear as the inviolable guardians of knowledge or power which mere mortals do not have direct access to. Besides the doctrinaire content is indisputable, the person of ministers is invested with an exceptional dimension. They embody the spiritual guardians of existence, at the etymological double meaning of the word religious. Whether to «re-read» a text (Cicero) or to «connect» (Lucretius) men to each other while «linking» the here below in the afterlife, there are the elected who remain intermediary agents between the layman and the sacred, between the hidden and the manifested, the mystery and the revealed.

Particular point of grace or privileged mystical bond on the other hand the fields of philosophy and science. It's up to everyone to search. No more than a book is sacred, the one who explains it has no special election privilege. He must prove what he is doing by exercising his faculty of rational criticism as far as he can. It's up to this same critical capacity, postulated in others, that he addresses himself.

If there is a link here, it is a horizontal discussion link based on the hypothesis of the universality of the faculty of reasoning freely. This is without doubt the primary meaning of the freedom of the layman in relation to the cleric. In this again, the philosophical mind is closer to the scientific mind than the religious spirit. Just remember the definition of the concept of proof that gives André Lalande (1962, pp. 822–823): «operation bringing intelligence unquestionably and universally convincing (at least in law), to recognize the truth of a proposition considered at first as doubtful». This definition unambiguously distinguishes scientific demonstrative argumentation or the philosophical dialogue of religious faith heard as «Strong adherence to the spirit, subjectively as strong as that which constitutes certainty, but incommunicable by demonstration» (ibid., p. 360).

In the case of religious beliefs, on the other hand, there is still a part of admitted mystery. Faith in the ineffable and intimate communion of the individual spirit with the fundamental principle of being remains the religious hope a radical non-everyday life. It remains beyond the comprehensible field human beings, times, places, exceptional events, beings' rebels in essence to any rational explanation. The etymology of the word «Mystery» invites the silent membership and not the contradictory discussion.

But it is precisely this dogmatic misunderstanding that refuses science. Not that the true scientist believes that he understands everything from reality; he knows his limited and questionable knowledge; but in law he postulates an unveiling limitless or prohibition of nature to human reason. Moreover, he refuses, in his practice, both the idea of occultism and that of miracle [25]. Conversely, the sincere believer may believe «because it is absurd». He must even believe for this only reason; must jointly challenge the scholar and the philosopher. Both of them refuse to make the mystery a principle and submission to the absurd a duty. Husserl emphasized the scope of this essential

distinction: «What is the fundamental meaning of any true philosophy? Is it not to tend to free the philosophy of any possible prejudice to make of it a rigorous autonomous science, realized by virtue of evidence from the subject itself and finding in these evidences an absolute justification? This requirement that some will find exaggerated, does it not belong not to the essence of any true philosophy?» [27, p. 5].

Basically, the religious spirit ends in the respectful silence of mysticism, as the intellectual itinerary of Pascal [2] shows, who will eventually distance himself from his scientific works in order to take refuge in the devotion and asceticism (Le Gall, 2000). The philosophical and scientific hope of knowledge postulates the contrary, not only that any thought enamored order remains verifiable and repeatable by everyone, but especially that a representation the current unknown is still thinkable, at least title of future possibility. Scholar and philosopher come together in lessons by Jules Lagneau: «A philosopher must be able to live and teach otherwise a universally valid doctrinal content, at least an attitude intellectual property without breaking with the fundamental requirement of universality of the reason» (1926).

G. First Principles and first Causes.

Undoubtedly, science has begun to detach itself from philosophy by its refusal to see its analyzes getting back to the «first principles and first causes» dear to Aristotle, that is to say to ultimate principles guaranteed veracious by their own evidence.

By refusing to examine these metaphysical hypotheses, a scientist like Newton feels he does not have to decide on issues that are beyond his power to know and his field of analysis. His «Non Fingo Hypotheses», «I do not pretend hypotheses», is not just a pronounced admission of ignorance in the interests of tranquility, it is more strongly a real methodological precaution dictated by prudence. His physicist hypotheses stick to the strict physical (Koyré, 1968).

The intimate nature of the beings remains by definition inaccessible because pushed back to the infinite, as it is so for the cause of causes or the principle of all principles. In mathematics, the axioms, once held for primary evidence, are today as simple postulates that we accept as tools, as the minimum rules useful for the functioning of the system [7] or as a starting point for a logic model [8]. In this sense, «the evidence», so dear to Descartes, appears today as possible bearer of illusion for the scientist. Every area where the scientific thought was formed into autonomous discipline began by overcoming obstacles related to the false evidences that enveloped it in a state properly prescientific. Against religion, but also against philosophy, the scientific spirit insists this time on the specificity of intellectual productions which are its and the original processes it institutes. An experimental protocol has nothing to do with the common experience. Experimentation is no longer the experience of a lived wave.

For Gaston Bachelard, for example, there is no direct link between dominant ideological conceptions at a time and scientific knowledge born at this time. On the contrary, science is built by following a rupture, so-called epistemological, with the common culture of time.

The sciences do not evolve by piling up but by contradiction and overcoming. Animistic temptations, ideas of occult properties, hidden substance, unitary knowledge, natural evidence, metaphysical intuition are all obstacles to the work of the scientist that try to maintain it in a pre-scientific state (1938).

H. The metaphysics in question.

Beyond the positivism of Auguste Comte, on which it will be necessary to return, this willingness to break with the field of philosophy, and mainly from the metaphysical, is confirmed by what is known as epistemology of the Vienna Circle. Rudolf Carnap [15] strives to constitute a rigorous «phenomenalism» to put an end, in the name of rigor scientist, what he calls the ramblings of philosophy. From 1931, in an article that immediately makes it famous, «The passing of the metaphysics by the logical analysis of language», it shows that the metaphysics' statements are neither empirical propositions based on experimental protocols and hence experimentally verifiable, nor deductive type propositions that would only explain the syntax of the language. These are undecidable statements; they remain neither true nor false from the point of view of the scientific view. The field of metaphysics consists only of pseudo-propositions, devoid of any possible link to the strict scientific truth.

Carnap does not question the fact that there can be a truth out of the hypothetical or inductive rigor of the sciences; his purpose is only to preserve scientific discourse from unverifiable contamination.

In its desire to unify science and to distinguish its practices from those of philosophy, the neo-positivism of the circle of Vienna had already published a manifesto as early as 1929 inspired by strict protocol of the natural sciences. This program, entitled: Scientific Design of world: the Vienna Circle, includes three key points that will influence strongly the epistemological reflection of the twentieth century. To unify science by a strict language with distinctive terminology from metaphysics and philosophy, Schlick, Carnap, Gödel, Von Neurath, Franck, Wittgenstein in its early days (1961), propose to deploy in scientific thinking, the model of empirical physical sciences and experimental. This undertaking will lead in 1934 to the publications of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.

Conclusion

To not conclude, the heterogeneity of scientific problems and philosophical doubts about the possibility that scientists and philosophers can work together on a common problem. How to conceive a combination of science and philosophy when the science has become empowered? Only a science still in its infancy can ask philosophy for interdisciplinary support for its research cognitive. As for ethical and normative issues, science in General does

not care: it cannot therefore provide its expertise on these questions – not directly, at least. Scientists can have a deontology, but which is not itself scientific; no more than the bioethics is not biological. That said, scientific knowledge may well constitute a useful prerequisite for the treatment of moral problems: the scientist nothing to say of normative as a scientist but the questioning normative must be informed by a preparatory scientific culture. In other words: a normative problem cannot be a problem (and therefore no interdisciplinarity is conceivable with the science to solve this kind of problem), but science is essential to the right wording of these problems (how does a collaboration multidisciplinary can be rewarding).

If everything has a story, then everything in history may not be reduced to history except to sink into the suicidal relativism of historicism (Popper, 1988). A hypothetical system is «counter-inductive», to express in Habermas terms (1983), that contrary to a precise theory, not against the inductive process of science in general. Caution, coherence, transparency, experimentation, mathematization remain, with the verifiability, the founding principles of any scientific claim. Pretention of knowledge to the universal, concern for the rational, the requirement of objective verifiability are somehow the minimum rules of politeness of any scientific work, the basic normative framework. As for the works, they constitute in themselves a reality that goes beyond the historical-social conditions that allowed them to blossom.

In this hypothesis, the historical and social context remains the condition of appearance of science, but not the criterion of its value, its relevance and its objectivity, even its limits. Bloor [10] may be forgets so quickly that linking a scientific hypothesis to a context in any way does not result in theoretical disqualification or, on the contrary, hermeneutical fecundity of this hypothesis. At the time we were talking about «Bourgeois formal science» and «decadent mathematics», Mauritius Dorolle (1927) insisted on the urgency of judging a scientific hypothesis on something other than its historical or geographical origin. Wealth, consistency, fertility and transferability are more discriminating criteria than those of the social, psychological or political origin of the authors.

«Scientific thought is nothing but the increasingly tight tissue of correlations reporting on experience». No offense to Feyerabend, in his concern of rigor and objectivity, scientific analysis allows an approach to the real by which its knowledge stands out from religious temptation, certainly legitimate from other intentions as well as metaphysics and the moral, often tempted by questionable rhetoric.

So, it remains more than ever urgent to distinguish the scientific field of the philosophical domain, as of the religious domain. Even if it is more of a distinction of approach and spirit than final aim and if the contacts are desirable, despite the always revisable boundaries, this distinction remains necessary if we want to expect from each domain what it can to offer. What can I know (theory of Knowledge)? What should I do (Morality)? What can I hope for (Religion)? What is the man? (Anthropology) asked Kant at the threshold of the critical philosophy, summarizing by these four questions the four fundamental fields of the human condition. Three questions that delimit three areas of knowledge to which science, philosophies and religions in their diversities try to provide an answer. Of course, conflicts can always arise but it is also appropriate that each domain be careful of its own deviances that may pervert the real scope. Each, in this sense, carries its cross: superstition, fanaticism, sectarianism is to the religious mind what dogmatism is to the true belief, a temptation always dangerous. Just like what more or less occult pseudo-sciences and quackery are in mind scientist. As for philosophy, it often tends to pervert into worship of the opinion of which the gurus and other prophets of the finished wisdom are the skilled manipulators. Nor does scientism embody the scientific spirit, the spirit of criticism is not confused with critical thinking. As to the refusal of universal reason, it is always curious to see him express himself in a speech that seeks the greatest possible rationality. Science, philosophy, religion appear as so many forms of aspiration to the true, as three «faces of life» to speak like Bertrand Russell (1971, 8). Still need to make sure to not confuse their respective characteristics and not to reduce them to what is only their caricatures.

Notes:

1 Ricoeur P. La philosophie aujourd'hui, entretien avec P. Ricoeur / Interview with Paul Ricoeur [on what is called the crisis of philosophy] // Today's Philosophy (Laffont Library of the Great themes). Lausanne-Barcelona : Editions Grammont-Salvat Editors. 1976. (II.A.314a.): «Philosophy – “that way of thinking that lies between religion and science”, as Bertrand Russell puts it – seems to have entered a fundamental crisis, the most serious in its history. Attacked on all sides by various scientific disciplines, she was challenged the traditional areas assigned to him by the Greeks. In turn, she turns to new fields of research: the merits of scientific omnipotence, the significance of history, the reflection on semiology and linguistics, aesthetics ...».

2 Einstein A. Science, Philosophy and Religion. Sep. 1940.

3 We mean here a «worldview» expressed as the «fundamental cognitive, affective, and evaluative presuppositions a group of people make about the nature of things, and which they use to order their lives» (see Hiebert P. G. Transforming Worldviews: an anthropological understanding of how people change. Grand Rapids, Mich. : Baker Academic. 2008).

4 See Bostock D. Plato's Theaetetus. Oxford. 1988. This quotation is restated in Plato's Theaetetus at 152a. Sextus Empiricus provides us a more direct quotation in Adv. math. 7.60: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

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ЛЮБОВЬ КАК ФОРМА САКРАЛЬНОГО

Аннотация. В данной статье мы рассмотрим концепцию любви Макса Шелера и «лестницу любви» Платона. Авторы выбраны не случайно, в обеих концепциях отмечается последовательный порядок, детерминированный в первом случае к божественному как абсолюту, во втором случае мы сталкиваемся со всеобщей устремленностью к идеальному и совершенному. Так, мы попытаемся раскрыть сакральность любви как способ экзистенциального существования, необходимый для обоснования своих жизненных ценностей через их связь с божественным или абсолютным, при помощи трансцендирования за рамки своего существования.

Ключевые слова: сакральное, любовь, экзистенция, абсолют.

«Сакральное (от лат. sacrum. – священное) – все то, что относится к культуре, поклонению особо ценным идеалам... Помимо теологического понимания сакрального как производного от Бога, существует расширительное его философское истолкование. Например, Э. Дюркгейм применил это понятие для обозначения