CRITICAL JUNCTIONS BEYOND COMPARISON: 
NOTES ON VISION AND METHODOLOGY

The author introduces the concept of critical junctions. The concept is placed in the context of discussions concerning modernity; then, its methodological underpinnings and alternative approaches to comparison are explicated. In the final part, the author demonstrates how to apply critical junctions method while analyzing “annus mirabilis” of 2011.

Key words: critical junctions, modernity, comparative methodology, globalization.

The intention of the talk is to introduce the concept of critical junctions. I use junction rather than junctures, which is used by political scientists and political historians and refers to temporal dimensions whereas, as you will see, the notion of critical junction is more complex and multidimensional than that. This is not meant to be just a nominalistic squabble. I will start to talk about modernity; what I am going to say is a crystallization of discussions we have been having over the last two years while this program at the ISPS in Ekaterinburg¹ has been formed. Then, I will talk about methodology and in particular about comparison, and then I will talk about the “annus mirabilis” of 2011. Altogether the intention is to bring out the methodology, the idea and the structure of argumentation and research around critical junctions.

The concept of modernity has been an object of intense discussion over the last 20–30 years. 20–30 years ago, we actually did not speak a lot about modernity; we spoke about modernization. Modernization theory reflected very self-consciously

¹ The graduate program in political philosophy at the Institute of social and political sciences was developed in partnership with AFP-OSI of which Prof. Kalb was a supervisor.
the rise of Europe, the rise of a particular sort of European civilization — urban; capitalist; the rise of specialisms, the rise of experts, the rise of specialization and profession; the rise of the university, the rise of science; and then all encapsulated in an urban industrial capitalism that was specifically European in the 19th and 20th century mode. The modernization paradigm was exported all over the world. It was a part of ‘development’; it was a part of what was going on in the UN. The idea of modernization was a packaged set of processes that encompassed urbanization, industrialization, mass education, specialized bureaucracies, Weberian forms of state formation — all that came together in creating modern civilization. As a matter of fact, over the last 20–30 years that paradigm was first critiqued by world-system theory, by Marxism, arguing that it projected a universalism that was in fact a particularism emanating from the core of the system and used to dominate the peripheries. Later it was criticized by post-modernism for its subscribing to a grand narrative. Then gradually in the course of these disputations modernization theory fell apart and lost its coherence and persuasion.

As a response, in the 1980s and the early 1990s, and accelerating after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the concept of modernity gained prominence. Modernity, first of all, does not signify a process. Modernization was a verb, but modernity is a substantive. Something interesting about timing and timings, about chronotopes, that is, temporal visions and expectations, had changed in the meantime. Modernity was a condition rather than a temporal process. Connected to that ‘de-temporalization’ of the concept was a spatial transformation. Anthropologists started to talk about African modernities. Under the hegemony of modernization it was Africa, par excellence, that was the recipient of advice, because it seemed to represent the very last platoon in the army of the modernizers. But in the 1990s Africa became the object of a lot of writing about modernity. Africa was now seen as having its own African modernities. That was a curse in the church of modernization theory, but it was an emblem in the discourse of modernity. The work of Jean and John Comaroff and Peter Geschiere exemplified this trend. The idea of ‘multiple modernities’, first coming from Shmuel Eisenstadt, was spreading. Africa was the most radical break in the modernization paradigm. The idea that there were multiple modernities added to that, multiple modernities that were based within the structures and the discourses of all existing ‘great traditions’ and civilizations, another rising concept, like Confucian, Hindu, Jewish, Christian and Arab-Islamic. The modernization paradigm was fracturing.

On the top of that, came postcolonial writing in India and in Latin America. The postcolonialists, for example Chakrabarty and a whole series of Latin-American authors (many of them partly located in the US) began arguing that in Latin America and in India you had a specific sort of postcolonial modernity, which had always already been in resistance to the colonial imposition of modernization thinking. In sum, you saw a whole set of new streams of research and thinking emerging that served to fragment the modernization concept, displace it temporally and spatially, and leave it empty in front of us.

Perhaps the most structural re-thinking of modernization theory may have sprung from the work of Jack Goody on Eurasia, though Goody stands for a large
body of historical work that began to highlight how modernity was in fact not so modern after all while modernization was not so recent after all. He started to place European modernities and European modernizations in a much longer timeframe, which basically spanned the whole Eurasian continent and set the early Mesopotamian civilizations, Chinese civilizations, Indian civilizations, the rise of the antique world and the rise of the Arab empires, and then from there through Florence and the Renaissance and the resurgence of Europe in the 16th–17th centuries, into one big temporal conversation. He basically argued that modernity cannot be seen in terms of a nation-state or in terms of a particular epoch or particular place where it seems focused. Modernity is an ongoing process with a very long sweep, or a sequence of sequences, of cultural, political, economic, scientific and artistic inventions, subjectivities in a broad sense of the term, associated with urban civilization as such, and continuously re-articulated through new urbanizations that dominate particular times and spaces. This planetary sequence of situated urban sequences accumulated over time to the US-focused global capitalist modernity that we have seen emerging over the last 100 years. Instead of Weber’s modernization as rationalist specialization, or the artistic avant-garde of the 1920–30s, you get a very long term vision of an array of hybrid urban cultural formations connecting east and west, north and south, that are consistently created and recreated, and giving their particular inputs to modern forms.

Altogether this amounts to a complete decentering of modernity and modernization. We should, of course, suspect that such intellectual decentering is not likely to be an intellectual accident. This complete overhaul of the modernization paradigm happens exactly at the moment that Europe and the US are losing their dominant geo-economic and political place in the world. Basically what we see is that these new ideas of modernity that already stirred in Braudel, Wallerstein and Friedman, reflect the decline of European inflected modernization as the dominant paradigm for acting, being and becoming in the contemporary world. Of course, it happens at the exact moment at which the center of the global system is shifting away from the West and moving to the East.

In this sense, our conference here and the conference in the next room² where they are talking about the place of Europe in the world, these two topics, are very closely connected. In the end, this is about geopolitics, and, as Wallerstein would have it, about geoculture. The recognition that there are multiple modernities, is also a recognition that there is a whole set of, if you like, competing civilizational centers, emergent political and economic (sub-)hegemons that are not western, that do not articulate their own self-consciousness in terms of simply copying western paradigms and, in fact, having first copied a lot from Western capitalist urbanization and industrialization, they self-consciously articulate an alternative vision. How do we call these competing visions? Should we accept that they are ‘Confucian’, or, in the case of Russia, Putinian, or Islamic and Hindu, etc.? I would strongly suggest that we contain our urge for labeling, certainly for labeling in the

² Conference “Modernity Junctures: Post-Socialist Institutions, Subjectivities and Discourses in Comparative Perspective” and conference “Europe in the Changing World”.
expected ways. These are dynamic processes without predestination. The actual outcomes anywhere will be outcomes of social and cultural contestation, not of traditional blueprints realizing themselves. And it is per definitionem very unlikely that such outcomes would reflect classic civilizational templates, if only because the rise of non-western regions is so much predicated on internalizing so many elements of Western modernity, from industry and technology to university systems, bureaucracies and legal process, also when these get internalized in differentiating ways. But apart from the actual outcomes, the important thing is that you indisputably have this shift away from the West. And with the shift from the West the whole concept of modernization and of the western-based templates of modernity is falling apart.

There is a hard core to modernity theory, however: urbanization, specialization and class formation remain essential for the concept of modernity. Emergent contemporary (sub-)hegemons — however non-western or post-western — have to master the generation of specialist knowledge, both in the sciences and in public or private bureaucracies. Without class formation no urbanization and no dynamic modern cultural economy are possible. However poststructuralist we may have become in the last decades, these remain straightforward structuralist truisms. So, the issue of urbanization, specialization and class formation remains, I think, the universal hard core of modernity theory. It is only those centers of emergent power that master ongoing specialization and class formation and build them together into a dynamic urbanism, which will actually be able to compete with the older hegemons.

Clearly, there is also an issue of scale here. In the course of time, it has become increasingly unimaginable that, for example, a city-state such as Florence or the United Provinces of the Netherlands would have enough spatial scale to form an independent force for modernity, and compete with the contemporary imperial cores of the west; you need scale for this. It is clear that China is a rapidly rising actor in the imperial competition, as is the loose grouping of the BRICS — minimally as a geopolitical fantasy and perhaps, though not very likely, as a concerted actor. All of these units are large spatial containers for urbanization, class formation and specialization. So, four structural things continue to count in the production of modernity: urbanism, specialization, class formation, and spatial scale.

Now, what about methodology against the background of this shift in thinking about modernity? This shift in thinking about modernity, where modernity becomes hinged on civilizational hegemons within global systems rather than separate nation-states, which were just the apparent container of modernity and modernization under the European paradigm, basically means that comparison becomes problematic. Comparison was always based on the nation-state. The nation-state unit has lost much of its coherence. Globalization is, of course, a key word here. It is ever clearer that a nation is not a discrete unit, that some nations are more so than other nations and do influence them; that nations have taken a nap in the swirl of global history and global process and they are not discrete actors within it. In other words, the nation loses its coherence, and comparison based on the nation state loses its attraction. Currently national units, whether they like it or not, are fragmenting. Their constituent parts relate in very different ways to the global
centers and to the hegemons, which already indicates that rather than synchronically comparing national units, we should be much more interested in theorizing the relations of particular places to the spatial and temporal processes as such, their relations to the hegemons.

All these different places — and this remains essential, I think — are inserted in different slots in global systems. That has again a lot of theoretical implications because it means that we can actually theorize the particular slot that a particular place ‘inhabits’. Do not imagine this as a static exercise: the slot is not the slot forever. The slot itself is a moment in the global ordering, and the moment in the global ordering has a particular speed, a particular direction of change itself. So, in this sort of Braudelian-Wallersteinian vision, you have particular slots in the global system, but the slots are dynamic just as the global system is dynamic. And what you ultimately need to try to capture is not the comparison between the slots, but the exact linkage between global histories and local histories, and vice versa, local histories and global histories. Now, if you look at particular units, at particular places in this global swirl, then you can actually identify particular properties of the relationships between local histories and global histories, and then you can give these properties a name. And if you give a name, you do a major discovery, because it basically means that you capture the structuring dynamics of what is going on in a particular place, that you propose a hypothesis.

Now, what this particular place itself thinks about itself may be very different from what you discover about that place, because they live within their own local histories and within the vocabularies that are generated within their local histories. Of course, they innovate, learn and modify their vocabularies over time. These vocabularies can be seen as meaningful traditions that are always rephrased, reappropriated and retuned into the idiom of new times. Nevertheless, languages, legal and institutional systems have a weight of their own and are never ‘reducible’ to these local-global structurizations. If you want to do innovative research at this point in time, which is not just a comparison between national units (what economists are so likely to do), it should be about trying to capture this local-global dynamic and propose a specific local/global understanding of the dynamics of local processes.

I call these local/global relations ‘critical junctions’. Critical junctions are multilevel, multi-scalar mechanisms that simultaneously integrate and differentiate places within global processes of modernity. And when I say places, I understand these places not merely as territorial spots, but as particular social histories within a more universal history. I will repeat that, so, critical junctions are multiscalar mechanisms of simultaneous integration and differentiation of places and particular social histories within global processes. You will understand why it is important to emphasize the dialectics between integration and differentiation. It is the particular ways in which places and particular social histories are integrated into global process over time that helps to differentiate them from each other. So, I propose the study of such critical junctions as an alternative to the more methodologically nationalist or territorially fetishist idea of comparison.

Now, when you look at comparative methodologies, there are two concepts that have been relevant in trying to capture precisely this sort of thing. And that is
Charles Tilly’s concept of encompassing comparison, and Philip McMichael’s incorporated comparison [1]. I think these three notions — critical junctions, encompassing comparison and incorporated comparison — are in a close conversation with each other. Tilly’s concept still reflects the hegemony of the comparative method more. Incorporated comparison basically starts from the world-system, starts from the global system and then looks at how particular units are incorporated within it. It is more structuralist, more world-systemic than either encompassing comparison or critical junction. I find this way of looking slightly rigid sometimes, too determined. I talk about critical junctions in order to capture the relational dynamism of local/global dialectics. Thus, I put more emphasis than the notion of incorporated comparison does on the emergent properties of any individual case. It also makes more space for the idea that the global system itself does not always have predictable structure and dynamics because surprising new local emergences, for example, the turn toward capitalism in formerly communist Eurasia, may shift the ‘structural’ properties of the global system as such.

Now, a useful exercise to think about this simultaneous integration and differentiation is, for example, the whole debate about the Axial Age. If you look at the big book on debt by David Graeber [2], David has this reconceptualization of the philosophical concept of the Axial Age, which is quite essential for his whole argument. The notion of the Axial Age was used by K. Jaspers to denote the period around 600 BC, where you had emerging all these different civilizational centers in the world, focused on one or another cosmic philosophy: Chinese, Indian, Greek, shortly there would be the beginning of the Roman center, Mesopotamia was still dynamic too. Now Graeber takes that concept out of its idealist connotations — for Jaspers, it is only about philosophies that were emerging in these different centers — but Graeber basically shows that these philosophies were local answers to general problems of urbanization and class formation. So, you have this whole rhythm, where all over the world, both in the west, in the center and in the east — and in fact the east is the center of that — all over the world you saw a formation of civilizational centers, political, economic, cultural hegemons emerging, to which political organizing and religious thought reacts. And you see the integration of these different civilizational centers into one world system, already in those days, and at the same time differentiation within world system through different emerging philosophies and religions that then gradually crystallize into very different sorts of feudalism from about 600 AD. So, the Axial Age discussion is a good illustration on how in global systems and global modernity you have integrative moments, the emergence of a whole set of similar imperial social systems and at the same time differentiating moments, with different cultural answers to the universal problems that arise in these centers.

Now, I will apply this to the annus mirabilis of 2011. The 2011 is an annus mirabilis because it is a confluence of protest movements that we have not seen since 1968 in the global system. 1968 in many ways, as I. Wallerstein has been emphasizing, can be seen as a signal moment in the US-European cycle of hegemony, cycle of modernity, a signal moment in which capitalism as such, as a structuring force of the European era began to lose its legitimacy. Habermas wrote about
the *Legitimationskrise*, too. The collectivity of protest movements starting off around that date — including in the Soviet world, including in the (post)colonial south, including in the west, worldwide — signaled a fracturing of hegemony, of capitalist hegemony and therefore of US hegemony among the world population. 2011 became the installment in that process, and it comes at a very particular moment, a moment at which actual hegemony over the system is clearly moving east. It is actually being discussed as nothing less than the decline of the west.

What did we see in 2011? Starting around 2000 there was already an accumulating wave of protest in Latin America, India, and China. By 2010 the statistics in China shows that you have about 70 thousand local rebellions per year, registered rebellions, rebellions against the terms of Chinese urbanization and industrialization. Many of these protests are industrial protests; many are peasant protests against the appropriation of land for industrial development reasons. The Chinese communist party by the end of 2011 started to recognize that it had to alleviate social inequalities, increase minimum wages, allow migrants into the regimes of urban citizenship (Hukou) and in general that it had to come up with all sorts of policies to deal with protest and with protest claims. Latin America too, of course, had a long run mobilization of its own that started in late 1990s but was accelerating in the course of the early 2000s. It contributed to the global wave of protest in 2011 with the Chilean student rebellion among others. India, too, was confronted by an intensifying rebellion in the ‘forests’ by the Naxalite Maoist movements. So, India, Latin America and China were ongoing protest landscapes in the first decade of the 21st century.

What was added in 2011 to this picture was, first of all, the Arab spring, the mass mobilizations in the European South, Occupy Wall Street in the US (not only in NYC), a satellite Indignados movement in Israel, youth riots in London, a big wave of miners’ protests in South Africa, etc. Late in the year Russia witnessed massive demonstrations against the purportedly fraudulent parliamentary elections and announcement of V. Putin’s run for another presidency term. It then had a tail in mass mobilizations in Bucharest in January–February 2012. And while all of this continued to simmer and crystallize politically, 2013 brought new waves of protest to Bulgaria and later Sofia in particular, to Brazilian cities and to Istanbul and Ankara. I see all of these as a part of the *annus mirabilis* of 2011.

I would argue that while all these different protest waves have world-systemic properties, they are, in fact, critical junctions within the global shift in hegemony and the contradictions that that global shift expresses. Each single one of them is different though. With a classic comparativist methodology you would look at them as so many discrete cases and you would find a lot of difference, contrasting properties even. The Arab spring against dictatorship is, of course, very different from the anti-austerity European mobilizations of 2011 and Occupy Wall Street, let alone the Maoists in India or the localized uprisings in China. There was a whole contingent of ‘professional mobilizers’ from the *Otpor* movement in Belgrade participating in the first blossoming of OWS, but back in Belgrade they said that “nothing that we did in New York was of relevance to Serbia”. That sort of observation was a right comment, I think, though only in a superficial way. So again, if you do
a classical comparative method, the coherence of 2011 falls entirely apart because you will have to deal with very different properties.

My argument would be that all these diverse properties are, in fact, reflective of the particular critical junctions of these particular rebellions with the global process of capitalist transformation and contestation. So, if we theorize the critical junctions of Latin America, or of Africa, of the East and Southern Europe, New York, Moscow, Bucharest, Sofia, Indian and Chinese rebellions, then we can actually, — if we theorize the critical junctions, — we can actually recompose a global picture and see that the structuring principles of the system as such, working out differently in different places, are the drivers behind all these varied rebellions, as was the case in 1968 and after. I realize that I do not have time to illustrate this grand claim now. But it will in any case be clear in what ways a critical junctions approach differs from a regular comparison of discrete cases. It assumes that the cases are in fact not discrete and not only located in local time. They are produced together in global time, respond to each other, and to their particular global/local predicaments within a global cycle of accumulation, contestation and change. There is synchronization and integration in ways that produce differentiation. We are still looking at the global/local unfolding of these stories of crisis, change and contestation. There is ongoing contingency, new elements are added regularly, but not in entirely unstructured ways. Thinking about critical junctions is a way to get at that structured contingency.

2. The First 5,000 Years by David Graeber Melville House, 2011.

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КРИТИЧЕСКИЕ СТЫКИ И СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ МЕТОДОЛОГИЯ

Автор вводит и обосновывает использование понятия «критические стыки». Это понятие рассматривается в свете дискуссий о модерности, затем излагаются его методологические основания и анализируются альтернативные сравнительные методологии. В заключительной части автор дает пример анализа «критических стыков» применительно к интерпретации событий «удивительного» 2011 г.

Ключевые слова: критические стыки, модерность, сравнительная методология, глобализация.

Понятие «модерность» находится в центре дискуссий последние 20–30 лет. Однако 20–30 лет назад говорили скорее не о «модерности», а о «модернизации...
ции». Теория модернизации вполне осознанно исходила из восхождения к глобальному доминированию Европы, особой европейской цивилизации, для которой были характерны высокая урбанизация, индустриальный капитализм, профессионализация и рационализация. Парадигма теории модернизации была затем расширена для анализа процессов во всем мире, но вскоре подверглась критике со стороны мирохронологического подхода и марксизма за навязываемый универсализм, бывший продуктом вполне конкретного, стремившегося господствовать над периферийной региона, и позднее со стороны постмодернизма — за приверженность к «большим наррративам». В 80–90-е гг. на первый план выходит понятие «модерность», существительное, указывающее на состояние, в отличие от подчеркивающего процесс понятия «модернизации», что свидетельствует о важном изменении временных и пространственных рамок. Стало возможным говорить об африканской модерности, о множественных модерностях, о постколониальной модерности. Особо следует упомянуть работы Дж. Гуди, который, поместив европейское развитие в более широкий пространственный контекст Евразии и раздвинув временные границы анализа, показал, что модерность — это исторический комплекс экономических, политических, культурных и научных новаций, возникающих в урбанизирующихся обществах. В целом декентрализация содержания понятий «модерность» и «модернизация» совершенно не случайно происходила в момент утраты Западом глобального доминирования, однако урбанизация, специализация, классообразование остаются универсальным ядром модерности. Именно эти процессы можно видеть в ныне растущих гегемонах. Вопрос масштаба, очевидно, играет сегодня важную роль: городские республики или малые государства уже не могут выступать независимыми силами в модерности. Потому для производства модерности четыре элемента задают аналитическую рамку: урбанизация, специализация, классообразование, пространственный масштаб.

Методология также претерпела изменения. Если для теории модернизации, обращенной к анализу европейских процессов, очевидным их «вместителем» были национальные государства, то в условиях глобализации необходимо сменить оптику: все разнообразные локальности обретают свое место (slot) в глобальной системе, имеют особенное отношение к гегемонам. Эти места лишь точки в глобальном упорядочении, ибо они изменчивы, и сама глобальная система подвижна. Потому важно не столько сравнение между этими точками, но выявление связи между глобальными и локальными историями. Эти локально-глобальные взаимодействия и названы «критическими стыками», т. е. многоуровневыми и разномасштабными механизмами интеграции и дифференциации локальностей в глобальной модерности. В отличие от сравнительных подходов Ч. Тилли и Ф. МакМайкла «критические стыки» позволяют выявить эмерджентные свойства индивидуальных случаев и учесть изменчивость самой глобальной системы. В качестве примера можно привести дискуссию об осевом времени. Отказавшись от идеалистической трактовки Ясперса, Д. Грейбер показывает, что культуры осевых цивилизаций были ответами на процессы урбанизации и классообразования. В качестве другого примера можно рассмотреть события 2011-го — «удивительного года». Это
удивительный год потому, что с 1968 г. не происходило стечения столь многочисленных и столь распространенных по всему миру протестных движений, как в 2011 г. Год 1968-й был знаковым в европейском цикле гегемонии, поскольку капитализм как структурирующая сила модерности утратил легитимность. Многочисленные протесты, виденные нами в 2011 г. (в Латинской Америке, Индии, Китае, США, Европе, арабских странах, Восточной Европе и даже России), имеют не только мировые характеристики, но и являются критическими стыками в глобальной перестройке гегемонии, несмотря на то, что каждое из протестных движений носит локально обусловленный характер. Другие сравнительные методологии рассматривали бы эти протестные движения как различные, несвязанные случаи. В нашем подходе мы можем раскрыть связь этих локальных протестов с глобальным процессом преобразования капитализма, смены структурирующих принципов системы, которая влечет за собой различные последствия в разных локальностях, но в глобальном времени. Синхронизация и интеграция осуществляются таким образом, что производится дифференциация. Изучая критические стыки, мы сможем раскрыть суть этих структурных перемен.

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**PUSSY RIOT: ТРИКСТЕР И СОВРЕМЕННЫЙ ГЕНДЕРНЫЙ РЕЖИМ**

В статье рассматриваются культурологические аспекты панк-молебна группы Pussy Riot. Особое внимание уделяется связи акции с культурой советского трикстера, а также реакциям российской интеллигенции на панк-молебен и преследование участниц группы.

Ключевые слова: Pussy Riot, трикстер, гендер, неотрадиционализм.

Постановка вопроса о «стыках модерности» выдвигает на первый план представление о внутренней противоречивости и неоднородности модерности. На мой взгляд, такой подход куда более правомерен и продуктивен, чем любые попытки выявить некий постоянный (или альтернативный) набор качества, определяющих данное состояние общества. Отказ от каталогизации необходимых и достаточных свойств модерности предполагает понимание последней как конфликтного поля, на котором сталкиваются различные дискурсивные и институциональные формы, каждая из которых генеалогически восходит к разным этапам в истории модерности, а также к домодерным и пост-модерным контекстам. (Хочу, кстати, подчеркнуть, что для меня постмодерн не противоположен модерности, являясь лишь одной, скорее всего не последней, из ее поздних фаз.)

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